Bill W

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STAFF

8 May 1979

NOTE FOR: D/CLLO
           D/PGO
           D/PAO ✓
           D/IRO

SUBJECT: Draft OMB Spring Review Book

ATOTHR

        Attached is a draft of the OMB Spring

Review Book. [   ] has asked for

comments by close of business tomorrow. If

you could have your comments to me by <u>noon</u>

ATOTHR

<u>tomorrow</u> I will consolidate them for [   ]

[   ] to forward to OMB.

                    STATOTHR

                    D/PBO

Attachment
   As stated--Draft

   This is Close-Hold for now.

DOS and OSD review(s) completed.

ACTION

Special Handling

CLASSIFICATION

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

STATOTHR

RESTRICTED TO FOLLOWING AUTHORIZED PERSONS:

Draft of NFIP and IRA issues; need your comments back as soon as possible, but Wednesday COB is sort of my timetable for going final! Among other things, please give attention to whether or not we have reflected the "agency request" i.e. DCI current position appropriately. Since we do not have a submit from you, I did my best guessing.

Rinie

RETURN BY HAND TO: Rm 8215

25X

1981 Spring Planning Review
National Foreign Intelligence Program
Issue #____ : NFIP Level

6/3/7?

Statement of Issue

What should be the level of NFIP funding for 1981-83?

Background

Planning figures for the 1981-83 NFIP approved in the 1980 budget were based on:

° the President's decision on the future satellite imaging mix;

° his decision on the NFIP funding level for 1980 and the outyears; and

° projected rates of inflation anticipated in January.

Since then, a number of factors have changed that require reconsiderations of the 1981-83

planning figures. Principal among these are:

° the President's recent decision on [   ] collection alternatives to replace the loss   25X1

25X1D   of [   ]

° mixed Congressional reaction to some of the proposed imagery and SIGINT programs;

° revised programmatic considerations and expectations; and

Big Deal, still way too law

° revised inflation rates that are approximately one percent higher than previously estimated.

Most of these items are discussed in detail in the attached issues.

Alternatives

25X1

#1. Increase the January planning ceiling by [   ] to accommodate   25X1

changes in inflation, telemetry collection initiatives, and other possible increases;

25X1A

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

(2) <u>Inflation Estimates</u>: The effect of a 1 percent increase in anticipated inflation
rates on the NFIP is not large -- in the range of [_____] It could   25X1A
be <u>offset by increased emphasis on efficiency and productivity</u> without a severely adverse impact..

(3) <u>Confidence in Intelligence Assessments</u>: Even with the loss of [_____] collection from   25X1

[_____]   25X1A

U.S. confidence in its ability to monitor SALT and other non-SALT aspects of Soviet
strategic and Warsaw Pact general purpose forces remains high. The incremental value
of significant additional resources applied to these problems appears marginal.
This is not true of our assessment of non-Communist World intelligence [_____]   25X1

[_____]   25X1

25X1A   [_____] The initial results of an OMB study on this problem indicate
that reasonably small amounts of additional resources may have a high return.

[   ]   25X1

[   ]

[   ]

[   ]   25X1A

<u>Budgetary effects (in millions of dollars)</u>

Planning base

    Alternative #1

    Alternative #2

    Alterna

1981 Spring Planning Review
National Foreign Intelligence Program
Issue # : Soviet Strategic and Warsaw Pact General Purpose Forces Intelligence

Statement of Issue

What adjustments should be incorporated in the 1981-83 planning ceiling for Soviet strategic and Warsaw

Pact general purpose forces?

Background

25X1A

Last year's OMB reviews of the National Foreign Intelligence Program placed considerable emphasis upon that

roughly [   ] of the targeted resources of the National Foreign Intelligence Budget dedicated to the collection,

processing and production of intelligence on Soviet strategic forces and Warsaw Pact general purpose forces. The

specific elements assessed included order-of-battle, weapons system technology, treaty monitoring, doctrine and

strategy, and warning. The assessments contained in those reviews reflected a reasonably satisfactory current

and prospective fulfillment of most peacetime intelligence objectives related to these issues, as shown on the

following table:

25X1

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25X1A

We believe these assessments remain valid today and will continue to be valid through the planning period based on the results of 1980 budget decisions. Nonetheless, because of changes proposed by Congress and other programmatic considerations and because of the considerable interest at this time in SALT monitoring, it is useful to review SALT monitoring capabilities and the events which may affect these capabilities. To place the contributions to SALT capabilities in perspective, a March 1978 DCI study assessed the relative contributions of the various collectors. The DCI's assessment was as follows:

25X1A

Near Term (1979-1983) Contribution to SALT Intelligence /1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1A

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7/7/79 DRAFT-

Issue #____ : Non-Communist World Intelligence

Statement of Issue

Are improvements needed in analytic and collection capabilities in order to respond effectively

to Non-Communist World intelligence needs?

Background

The President and other high-level policymakers have repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction

with Non-Communist World intelligence; in other words, with the quantity and quality of

information produced by the intelligence and foreign affairs communities on Non-Communist

World countries. The President has asked Dr. Brzezinski, Admiral Turner, and Secretary

Vance to look closely at this area for possible improvements. In addition, the President

has publicly expressed his concern that open source information may have been inappropriately

de-emphasized during the last 15 years. The events in Iran and the attendant claims of

intelligence failures have created a special incentive to pursue improvements in Non-Communist

World intelligence.

Thus, the Intelligence Branch, in cooperation with the International Affairs Division, has:
(1) reviewed current studies and initiatives related to improving Non-Communist World intelligence,
and (2) initiated an in-depth study on Non-Communist World reporting.

The OMB-initiated study is designed to (1) expand and verify or modify OMB's assessment
of Non-Communist World intelligence, (2) identify current and projected resources devoted to this
intelligence, (3) analyze deficiencies and constraints contributing to problem areas, and (4) develop
alternative resource levels and other recommendations related to improving Non-Communist World
intelligence. On a preliminary basis, our current assessment of capabilities on Non-Communist
World intelligence is provided below.

Our review of current studies and initiatives related to improving Non-Communist World intelligence
has included the following major ongoing actions:

(1) David Aaron (NSC), David Newsom (State), and Frank Carlucci (CIA) are members of a Political
     Intelligence Working Group. The group meets regularly and has focused on improving intra-
     mission coordination and developing more comprehensive collection requirements on key Non-
     Communist World countries.

(2) State has developed reporting profiles on several key Non-Communist World countries and,
     based on the coverage and information gaps identified, has prepared a preliminary proposal
     for 723 additional political officer positions.

2

(3) The DCI's collection staff is expanding its evaluation of mission reporting and initiating a country-based tasking and evaluation system, starting with [   ] it is also reviewing STATOTHR several improvements for open source collection, including the establishment of a permanent working group on this subject.

(4) The DCI's resources staff is studying the implications of resource reallocations to improving political and economic intelligence and examining the linguistic problem within the Intelligence Community.

(5) CIA has developed a professional inventory containing background information, skills, and work data on almost all CIA intelligence analysts and is considering ways to alleviate gaps identified.

It is possible that these initiatives will be translated into specific resource or non-resource-related recommendations. At the moment, only State has identified a preliminary request for additional political reporting officers.

Alternatives

#1. Increase NFIP and State Department ceilings to provide for improvements in Non-Communist World reporting.

#2. Have the President request a comprehensive plan be developed jointly by the DCI and the Secretary of State and submitted to NSC as soon as possible (August 1). Retain previously approved ceilings.

3

The major questions associated with this issue are:

What information needs on Non-Communist World countries are not being satisfied?

What are the deficiencies and constraints which need to be corrected to improve Non-Communist World intelligence?

Based upon a review of Community evaluations of mission reporting, discussions with consumers and National Intelligence Officers concerned with Non-Communist World countries, a surprisingly consistent picture emerges regarding what is and what is not being covered well. Generally, consumers and analysts seem satisfied with coverage of the country's foreign policy, highest governmental leadership, current political and economic events, support on critical U.S. negotiations and crisis reporting. The reporting gaps cited below are virtually universal.

STATOTHR

4

We believe that one of the principal reasons that these gaps remain is that corrective actions run against the priorities that have been internalized by the Intelligence Community and the Foreign Service. Funding constraints and employment reduction programs have tended to accentuate traditional emphasis toward correction and analysis on the Communist World and toward current events reporting. Not only has this affected current allocation of resources, it has significantly influenced the kinds of long-term investments needed to build and maintain an effective Non-Communist World collection and analysis effort.

But there also are a multitude of other variables which now contribute to less than satisfactory performance against Non-Communist World intelligence requirements including foreign language deficiencies, U.S. policy restrictions against clandestine collection in some countries, inadequate regional and sectoral coverage by U.S. missions overseas, insufficient intra-mission coordination, inadequate utilization of open source information by analysts, deficient data handling systems, and less than conducive analytic environments. The relative impact of changing non-resource related variables on improving Non-Communist World intelligence is not clear. This should be examined prior to concluding that additional collection or analysis resources are required.

OMB's preliminary view is that significant improvements in Non-Communist World intelligence can be achieved with existing resources, but selective additions in additional resources and personnel may be required to achieve satisfaction. The nature of these additional resources (improved open source

6

collection programs, more specialized attaches, more State Department political officers, more CIA

case officers [   ] more analysts in headquarters, etc.) varies greatly by subject

and country.

OMB staff is concerned that the initiatives under way within the Department of State and the Intelligence

Community are not adequately dealing with the Non-Communist World intelligence problem. The efforts

of the Political Intelligence Working Group have concentrated on State and CIA collection and have

not selectively identified, from the wider range of information resources available, the best and

most efficient way to solve Non-Communist World information needs. Most importantly, this effort appears

to have overlooked the prospects for corrective action within the analytic arena. Other initiatives

are being pursued on an ad hoc basis and are not effectively tied into the larger question of improving

Non-Communist World intelligence. *Give us better? Only if you give us more?*

The Department of State's proposal to add 723 political officers is indicative of the problems cited

above. It is not based on a comprehensive analysis of information gaps; it has failed to acknowledge

the role of non-State reporting resources; it has not been coordinated with CIA or Defense; and it

assumes the Non-Communist World intelligence problem is entirely collection-related. Given the

multitude of variables which need to be examined to effectively deal with Non-Communist World intel-

ligence requirements, what appears to be missing is a well-coordinated, comprehensive and logical

approach.

We recommend that the President communicate his concern about current initiatives to improve Non-Communist World intelligence and request the DCI and the Secretary of State to submit a comprehensive plan to the NSC by August 1, 1979. The plan should include an articulation of Non-Communist World intelligence information needs that are not now being satisfied, a review of alternative ways of filling these gaps and a justification for the alternative(s) proposed. Resource and non-resource-related initiatives should be presented, and all aspects of the intelligence process should be considered. Finally, initiatives should be prioritized in terms of their significance to improving Non-Communist World intelligence and the difficulty and time involved in implementing them.

is it ever?

Since the resource sensitivity of this problem is not clear, OMB staff does not now recommend an increase in the NFIP or State Department 1981 ceilings. We do consider the question of improving Non-Communist World intelligence to be a current concern that needs to be dealt with in the near term. While improvements in Non-Communist World intelligence may involve long-term investments which could affect 1981 funding, more immediate steps need to be taken either by redirecting or reallocating current resources or by seeking additional 1979-1980 funding.

Alternative #1 (Agency request)

No specific agency request is available at this time. The Department of State has proposed and the Intelligence Community may propose increases in collection activities and initiatives in other areas in response to the President's interest in improving Non-Communist World intelligence.

8

STATOTHR *Oh my goodness! This logic is pathetic.*

An addition of [ ] million to the NFIP and State Department 1981 ceilings may encourage the development of creative solutions to the Non-Communist World intelligence problem. However, the number is an arbitrary one; it is not known how resource-sensitive this problem is. Additional resources, to the extent they are justified, may be more appropriate in 1979-1980.

STATOTHR

Alternative #2   *buys [ ] people. Utter nonsense?*

The current NFIP and State ceilings should be retained. Admiral Turner and Secretary Vance should be requested to develop a comprehensive strategy for early NSC review on improving Non-Communist World intelligence. The strategy should identify tradeoffs required to accommodate these new initiatives within existing resources, but the NSC should address the possibility of both 1980 and outyear increases, if required.

Budgetary effects (in millions of dollars)

STATOTHR

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Alternative #1 - Agency request					
Alternative #2					

Implementation of OMB Recommendation

OMB will prepare a proposed letter from the President to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of State which expresses concern about efforts under way in response to his interest in improving Non-Communist World intelligence and which requests a jointly developed plan to be submitted to the NSC no later than August 1, 1979. The letter would outline the information desired and the dimensions of the problem to be considered. OMB's policy letter would reference the President's letter and would

request that all 1981 initiatives related to improving Non-Communist World intelligence be

highlighted in the ZBB submissions and ranked both as part of the overall programs and separately,

as part of a joint NFIP/State ranking.

10

5/7/79 DRAFT—[   ]

Overview of DOD Intelligence
and Intelligence-Related Activities

Too narrow

Defense intelligence activities outside of the NFIP generally consist of programs to provide enemy
information to users in wartime for the purposes of command and control (i.e., operational planning

not accurate   *inaccurate*

and maneuvering of forces) and targeting. Four types of warfare are supported by these programs --
Theatre warfare (e.g., NATO, Korea), Naval warfare (e.g., sea lane protection, blockades), Inter-
continental warfare (e.g., missile and bomber attacks), and Space warfare (e.g., Anti-satellite
system operations). Many types of systems and forces have been and are being developed to address
the diverse needs of users concerned with these various types of conflict: *IRA, such?*

- Radars for long-range detection of aircraft (e.g., E3 AWACS, and multiple types of ground-
  and ship-based air surveillance radars [   ]   25X1

- Radars for monitoring the disposition and activities of surface forces (e.g., radars on
  RF4, TR1, and OV1 aircraft; artillery-locating radars; and small moving vehicle and personnel-
  detecting radars);

[   ]   25X1

- Signal intelligence systems for detecting, locating, and collecting against enemy radios

  and radars on the ground, in the air, and at sea (e.g., COMINT and ELINT sensors on RF4, TR1,

  RV1, RU21, and EP3 aircraft, numerous naval vessels and trucks);

25X1

- Imaging systems for monitoring the disposition and activities of surface forces (e.g., film

  cameras carried on RF4, SR71, and OVI/10 aircraft and electro-optical and/or infrared sensors

  carried by these same types of aircraft as well as drones and remotely piloted vehicles).

25X1

- Human intelligence collection for observing ground forces (e.g., observation aircraft and

  helicopter units, prisoner-of-war interrogation teams, artillery sound and flash-ranging

  teams, and unattended ground sensor platoons);

- Acoustic intelligence systems to detect and track submarines (e.g., the Sound Surveillance

  System – SOSUS and the Surface Towed Array Surveillance System – SURTASS);

25X1

TOP SECRET

• Processing and dissemination equipment and personnel associated with each type of sensor, along with multiple source processing (e.g., WS430B imagery processing center, the transportable sound intercept facility (for COMINT), possible Battlefield Evaluation and Target Acquisition (BETA) type centers).

25X1

Collectively, these activities will be termed "combat surveillance" in this paper and the equipment used will be called "Combat Surveillance Systems" to distinguish them from both weapons systems

funded in DOD and national intelligence systems funded within the NFIP. Many of these systems can support operations in more than one type of warfare area. For instance, U.S. E3 AWACS can provide information to users in intercontinental, theatre, and naval warfare, BMEWS radars support both intercontinental and space warfare, and naval reconnaissance and SIGINT aircraft and air sur- veillance radars can support both naval and theatre warfare.

25X1

Peacetime contributions are also significant. NATO E3 aircraft will provide surveillance of East European air movements; SOSUS detections are very important in the peacetime tracking of Soviet submarines, space surveillance radars and cameras are critical in tracking the growing inventory of Soviet space objects and DSP provides trajectory information on launches of ballistic missiles worldwide.

25X1

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1981 Spring Planning Review
NFIP and DOD Intelligence
Issue #IIIC - Theatre Battlefield Surveillance

.25X1

Statement of Issue

What level and mix of combat surveillance systems is needed to support theatre air and ground operations?

Background

Intelligence needed to support ongoing theatre air and ground operations comes from three generic sources - combat forces and weapons systems, national intelligence systems 25X1 and from combat surveillance systems which exist primarily to detect and monitor the enemy in wartime. DOD funding projections now provide for the indefinite retention of most existing combat surveillance systems and the development and procurement of a number of new systems, most of which are associated with data collection. While some of these are ground-based, many are airborne to provide coverage of more distant ground and low-altitude air targets. Other collection systems (not covered here) are sea or space-based and are being improved and could provide theatre information in many circumstances. Processing systems needed to extract the most useful information from the various data streams, combine it with other data and disseminate 25X1 it to users are also included here.

Alternatives

#1. Expand combat surveillance capabilities by maintaining most current collection systems and investing in families of airborne and ground based sensors in the early 1980s and improved processing and dissemination capabilities for the mid to late 1980s. 25X1

why next?
this long

#2. Emphasize improved all-source processing and dissemination in the early 1980s with selected collection improvements centered on standoff aircraft supporting NATO-wide operations, and ground systems to support U.S. artillery targeting. De-emhasize other improvements centered mainly on aircraft collection and phase out some less cost effective systems. [ ]

25X1

Analysis

The major issues associated with these programs are:

- Processing and dissemination – the extent to which collected data can and will be rapidly and reliably evaluated, communicated to, and absorbed by many tactical users. Communications and processing have historically presented serious probjems both within and among U.S. air and ground units. Communications difficulties alone have been a major factor preventing timely collection tasking and/or information dissemination. The more severe environments expected in future conflicts will further compound these problems, as will the multi-national nature of the forces involved (most of the forces involved in likely conflicts (e.g., NATO, Korea) will probably be non-U.S., and these forces have both less technical collection capability and less effective communications with U.S. forces). Major U.S. intelligence processing and dissemination deficiencies in the past have been both technical and administrative; these are correctable but, due to the lack of any joint service architecture for tactical intelligence, will probably remain a serious impediment for some time. A multi-national architecture, although also needed, is even further away. [ ]

25X1

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• Information utility ~~Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001100060010-9~~ ity can be reasonably

expected to influence the course of battle. In wartime as well as peacetime, considerable information

is collected which turns out to be of low value for many understandable reasons which do not relate to

collection system performance _per se_. Notwithstanding this lack of a necessary correlation between collec-

tion volume and intelligence value, combat surveillance systems are customarily justified on the inability

to collect data, as opposed to providing the data that can seriously affect the course of battle. The

ultimate utility of more data to potential recipients (in terms of battle outcomes) is rarely examined

and is often questionable on several grounds: ☐   25X1

- limited recipient ability to receive and absorb data

- limited recipient ability to exploit data (e.g., munitions or transportation constraints)

- limited recipient ability to reconcile conflicting, ambiguous, or incomplete data

- relatively large information inputs from other sources (notably including direct observation and

25X1   reporting from engaged units). ☐

In short, the extent to which additional information from these systems can be relied upon to "multiply" force

capabilities is not clear, and may not justify large expenditures which ultimately must come at the expense

25X1 of combat forces. ☐

- Redundancy - the extent to which coverage of the same targets by multiple systems is needed. The most

  common types of high-priority intelligence targets in theatre war are relatively few in number:

  - (tank,) infantry, artillery and air defense units and equipment

  - fighter/attack aircraft and helicopter units and equipment

  - supporting C^3I units and equipment. ☐

any word all low

25X1

Because these targets are both important and numerous, many types of surveillance systems have been conceived to

detect them. Some system redundancy provides backup in case of jamming and deception and compensates for the low

sustainability of some systems. Extensive redundancy, however, may also compensate for poor and unreliable communi-

cations, which is perhaps a principal underlying cause. The ultimate utility of providing multiple types of systems

is not clear, however. In those circumstances where the improved sharing of available information is permitted by

improved communications, highly redundant collection appears unnecessary and may be a luxury. In those circum-

very little of these data are self-sufficient or self-inclusive.

stances where communications are so poor as to regularly prevent dissemination of critical intelligence to some

types of military units, the utility of providing costly independent collection systems to these units is probably

low because they would likely be ineffective in any case - due to a lack of command and control. ☐

25X1

- Effective sustainability - the extent to which these systems can be expected to survive and operate in

  a severe defensive, electronic jamming, and weather environment using personnel projected to be on hand.

  All of these systems operate in combat theatres and are subject to wartime attrition. Some are inherently

  less survivable than others, however, particularly those which must operate within range of SAMs and

  artillery and/or which are easily detected and identified. In wartime, these types of systems may be forced

  to operate in ways which significantly reduce their surveillance capability. Alternatively they may operate

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to provide the collection capability desired but may suffer high attrition. Attrition buys at realistic rates are usually not programmed; if they were, costs would be significantly higher. .25X1

Collection systems based on light aircraft and helicopters have inherently low unit sustainability because of fuel constraints. In addition, the effective operation of many radar, ELINT, and COMINT systems depends heavily on the electronic jamming environment (both enemy and friendly) and collection utility will likely decrease (due to interference) with increases in this growing threat. Moreover, all of these systems require highly skilled personnel (e.g., pilots, aircraft mechanics and crewmen, linguists, radar image interpreters, computer operations, electronics technicians) to operate and maintain the complex equipment and to process its output. It is highly questionable if these personnel will be available in the quantities and qualities needed to sustain high-tempo operations by all of the projected systems.

25X1

25X1 **Alternative #1**

The predominant theme is development, procurement and use of independent surveillance systems by different types, echelons, and nationalities of forces. Almost all existing collection systems are retained indefinitely and major additional investments are made across the board, expecially in radar and SIGINT aircraft (e.g., U.S. E3, TR1, AND UH60 and NATO AWACS). Processing and dissemination of information to multiple users is not heavily relied upon, although improvements will ultimately be fielded. Redundancy increases and becomes relatively extensive near U.S. forces, but a variety of tactical users will have some access to relatively responsive collection systems, at least in peacetime and in the early stages of conflict. 25X1

The Hodge-Podge alternative

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Alternative #2

The predominant theme is to emphasize critical improvements in processing, dissemination, and aircraft collection until a joint service architecture has been constructed and implemented, and until more and better assessments of the effects of improving intelligence on military operations have been completed. Most existing collection systems (including several hundred combat surveillance aircraft) are retained until better methods of securing needed data are in operation. A major investment is made in radar and SIGINT aircraft (NATO AWACS and a multisensor TR1) capable of providing support to both U.S. and Allied ground and air forces. Greatly improved processing and dissemination, artillery location, and close-in imaging capability for U.S. forces is also provided. Redundancy is only slightly greater than at present, except in air surveillance. Some older and less cost-effective systems are phased out. (The increased capabilities of weapon sensors and national intelligence systems are acknowledged and will be fully exploited. A summary of major system adjustments is

25X1 shown in Table 1.

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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C^{3}I GUIDANCE ANNEX
to
SECTION O

COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND, CONTROL, AND INTELLIGENCE

of the

Department of Defense

	OPI	INFO	
DR/DD			DRAFT
CS			
VP			CONSOLIDATED GUIDANCE
DIO			
DP			
DC			FY 1981 — 1985
AH			
RS			
RCC			
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RDS			
RSP			
DM			April 12, 1979
ACTION			
DG			

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence)

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30 DAY RETENTION REQUIRED

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ASD (C^{3}I) CONTR. NO. 059-79

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

April 12, 1979

COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND,
CONTROL, AND INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
        DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
        SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
        CHAIRMEN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
        UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
        ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
        ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
        ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS,
          AND LOGISTICS)
        ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION)
        ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON NATO AFFAIRS
        ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
        DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
        DIRECTOR, DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
        DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
        DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
        COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

SUBJECT: C^3I Annex to the Consolidated Guidance

My memorandum of 12 February 1979 forwarded the draft C^3I Guidance Annex
to Section 0 of the DoD Consolidated Guidance FY 1981-1985, and solicited
your comments and suggestions. These have been reviewed, and many have
been incorporated in the attached revision. The diligence exhibited by
OSD, OJCS, the Services, and the Defense Agencies has helped produce a
substantially improved basis for achieving balance and coordination in
the interdependent, evolutionary, and multi-Component activities which
typify the C^3I portion of the Defense Program.

My staff and I wish to express our appreciation for the help received
in producing this supplemental guidance, and we look forward to seeing
our collective efforts come to fruition in the Program Objective
Memoranda.

Gerald P. Dinneen

Gerald P. Dinneen

Attachment

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT THIS
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED. **SECRET** ASD(C^3I) Contr No. 059-79

C³I GUIDANCE ANNEX
to
SECTION O

COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND, CONTROL, AND INTELLIGENCE

of the

Department of Defense
DRAFT
CONSOLIDATED GUIDANCE

FY 1981 — 1985

April 12, 1979

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence)

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C^{3}I GUIDANCE ANNEX

FY 1981 - 1985

Foreword: (U) This annex is furnished in accordance with Section 0: Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence (C^{3}I) of the Department of Defense Consolidated Guidance, FY 1981-1985, and supplements the C^{3}I Objectives, Policies, Issues, Requirements, and General Guidance that are furnished in Section 0.

I.   STRATEGIC C^{3}I   (U)

   A. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL   (U)

(S)   Air Force shall finalize results of the DT&E/IOT&E test program on the E-4B test bed aircraft in preparation for DSARC III in early FY 1980; program for a fleet of six interoperable E-4B aircraft with an FOC of FY 1987; structure the program to accommodate one E-4A to E-4B modification per year during FY 1980, 1981, and 1982 with procurement of the fifth and sixth aircraft in FY 1983 and 1984 at the Decremented level; and accelerate aircraft procurement at the Basic level.

(S)   Air Force shall investigate mission effectiveness of and program for future E-4B system improvements, e.g., additional SHF channels, improved secure data, voice and graphics conferencing capability, the data bus concept, and IONDS direct readout; and perform and report on trade-off and economic utility studies regarding modifications vs. acquisition of equipments such as the ARC-58 and ARC-89 systems. These studies shall be coordinated with the WWMCCS System Engineer (WSE) as they become available.

(S)   In addition, Air Force shall program for essential C^3 enhancements to those EC-135 aircraft required to augment the E-4B fleet.

(U)   The JCS, with support from Air Force and DCA, should consolidate plans and implement common ADP capabilities on EC-135's and E-4's for respective airborne command post roles.

   B. STRATEGIC SURVEILLANCE AND WARNING   (U)

      a. Missile-Attack Warning   (U)

(S)   Air Force shall improve survivability of DSP connectivity to users by programming for austere backups to existing ground stations and fully mobile ground terminals in accordance with the FY 80-84 FYDP. Survivable communications between these additional ground stations and survivable user facilities should be an integral part of these programming actions to enhance end-to-end (satellite-to-user) data survivability. An approach calling for additional dedicated satellites for DSP communications (Snuggler) is not to be pursued.

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OA-1

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(S)   BMEWS attack assessment capabilities shall be improved by upgrading or replacing current equipment. BMEWS Site I improvement is to be completed by FY 1983 in accordance with the FY 1980-84 APDM. A study delineating benefits and costs of attack-assessment upgrades to BMEWS Site II upon completion of the Site I upgrade is to be submitted to OSD by December 1979. A program for the BMEWS Site II upgrade should be included in the FY 1981-1985 POM at the Enhanced level. Air Force shall retain PARCS as a backup until the BMEWS I improvement is operational. Improve the COBRA DANE TOR, communications and radar hardware and software.

(S)   Air Force shall plan for missile-warning dual-phenomenology coverage of present and potential threat areas for attacks against CONUS. Specifically, it should define least cost options for providing dual phenomenology coverage for potential SLBM launch areas to the south of the U.S.

(S)   Air Force shall submit a recommendation and proposal to OSD regarding a DSP follow-on which provides earlier attack characterization than the radars and is significantly more survivable than DSP. Air Force should include net costs, DSARC I, II, and III milestones associated with an operational prototype, and consider utilization of DARPA technology where appropriate.

        b. Aerodynamic-Threat Warning (U)

(S)   Air Force shall program for improvement of the current DEW Line capability and maintenance of that capability. Air Force shall: continue the restructured OTH-B prototype effort including planning for limited azimuthal coverage systems, to permit earlier operational deployment and reduced investment costs if approved; and program for bomber/cruise-missile-carrier warning in two phases with near-term emphasis on a low-cost warning network sufficient to alert the NCA of an impending attack from the Northern and coastal approaches to CONUS, and research and development of a longer-term space-based system capable of airspace surveillance. Additional funding should be provided in FY 1981 to examine space-based concepts appropriate not only to CONUS air warning requirements, but to a broader range of missions, including support of worldwide naval operations and theater warning applications. R&D should be programmed at a level adequate to determine probable performance, cost, schedule and technical risk data pertinent to space-based alternatives.

        c. Space Surveillance (U)

(C)   Navy shall program for continued modernization of NAVSPASUR.

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C. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (U)

(C)   DCA, Navy, and Air Force shall accelerate adaptive HF programs to ensure completion as soon as possible. Except in cases where OSD has determined that existing equipment will be logistically unsupportable prior to FY 1986, Air Force shall withhold decision on procurement of replacement HF radios for strategic aircraft pending decisions resulting from the adaptive HF program.

(S)   Air Force shall program for procurement of UHF SATCOM terminals for an appropriate mix of LCCs, B-52Ds and tankers and subsequent SHF conversion of the LCC terminals, and for an SHF satellite downlink to the LCCs. Air Force shall also program for continuation of MEECN VLF improvements, e.g., mini-VLF receivers for B-52 and FB-111 bombers, 616A modems, and Diversity Reception/ Automatic Combining on airborne command posts (E-4s and EC-135s) and bombers (B-52s and FB-111s). Air Force should examine Navy TACAMO capabilities and initiatives for VLF/LF received-signal processing as alternatives to Piecing.

(S)   Navy shall program to continue the Service Life Extension Program and procure additional TACAMO aircraft to ensure 100-percent airborne coverage in both the Atlantic and Pacific. In addition to completing the EC-130 modification and replacements, Navy shall install Diversity Reception/Automatic Combining on TACAMO VLF/LF receivers. Compatibility with Air Force VLF/LF must be ensured.

(S)   In accordance with the 18 January 1979 DSARC, Air Force shall initiate a definition and validation phase for the Strategic Satellite Space (SSS) segment which includes preliminary system design and development of high-risk subsystems. Planning should include consideration of Theater Nuclear Force communications needs, and reflect approval and implementation of a limited upgrade of the Satellite Data System, until SSS risks have been reduced and schedules are clear as determined at future DSARC meetings. Air Force shall determine feasibility, cost and impact of using existing and planned single-channel transponders to provide report-back, via experiments and contract studies. These tests and studies must be completed before SSS space segment definition and validation phase contracts are awarded.

(U)   Navy shall continue its site-independent planning for an austere ELF communication system, and program for continued operation of the Wisconsin Test Facility in support of system design refinements and transmitter and receiver improvements, using propagation validation testing results; and accomplishment of ecological/biological research as deemed necessary for satisfaction of system environment considerations.

(S)   JCS, in conjunction with the CINCs, Services, and Agencies, shall delineate operational needs for reconstituted strategic communications. DCA, in conjunction with the CINCs, Services and Agencies, and in coordination with the Office of the Manager, National Communications

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System and the Federal Preparedness Agency, shall develop a compre-
hensive plan for management of the strategic communications recon-
stitution process, to include means for identification of surviving
assets, interconnection, and system control, responsive to those
requirements.

(C)   JCS, in coordination with the CINCs and Agencies, shall
update Continuity of Operations Plans, Operations Concepts and the
Alert System, and in coordination with the CINCs, develop a WWMCCS
exercise plan for training and evaluation of the strategic communi-
cations reconstitution process.

(U)   Services shall program for implementation of recommendations
of the SAC and Navy Connectivity Studies as approved by the ASD(C^3I).

.(S)   DCA, in conjunction with the Navy and Air Force, shall
develop comprehensive plans for reconstitution of satellite communi-
cations and for assessing the contributions which could be made to
strategic communications reconstitution by: balloon-lofted trans-
ponders for UHF/UHF and UHF/VLF relays; mini-air pods at MF and above
for military and civil aircraft; surface ship relays; VLF/LF assets
on contingency communications platforms; and power distribution grids.

(S)   DCA, in conjunction with the JCS, CINCs and Services,
shall formulate a structured approach to HF radio usage for recon-
stitution of strategic communications, and in coordination with the
Office of the Manager, National Communications System, shall develop
a strategy and formulate recommendations for use of common-carrier
and civil communications assets to facilitate reconstitution of long-
haul connectivity.

D. STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS (U)

(U)   The Services, DCA and WSE should plan to field WWMCCS
Automated Message Handling Systems through FY 1981-83 as outlined
in the DoD Automated Message Handling Systems Plan.

(U)   The WSE, with OJCS, Service and Agency support, shall conduct
the System Alternative Definition Phase of the WWMCCS Information
System (WIS) Program to provide a first assessment of WIS evolution
for review by the WWMCCS Council in late FY 1980, and alternative
architectural options to the WWMCCS Council in early FY 1982. Services
and Agencies will identify to the WSE technical work currently being
performed, or planned, that is supportive of evolution of the WWMCCS
Automatic Data Processing (ADP) System into the WIS. Prior to FY 1982
POM submittal, the WSE with support from the OJCS, Services and Agencies
shall develop an acquisiton strategy to guide the implementing phase
of the WWMCCS ADP System into the WIS. The WSE, with support from
the JCS, Services and Agencies, shall assess funding requirements for
the FY 1983 to FY 1986 period for hardware acquisition and system
software developments for the WIS. This assessment should be reported
in sufficient time for inclusion in the FY 1982 POM.

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(U)   JCS, Services, Defense Agencies, and WSE shall continue efforts to improve the correlation of operations and intelligence information to support command decision-making. JCS, in collaboration with the Services and Agencies shall develop a management structure for establishing and maintaining evolutionary DoD standard software for the growing inventory of minicomputers.

(U)   Near-term improvements of the WWMCCS ADP system should continue with emphasis on improvements in the period FY 1981-1983 to selectively extend the useable life existing systems beyond FY 1986. DCA should develop programs to provide improved terminals and display, query and response and data management capabilities for WWMCCS ADP community use during FY 1980-85 period.

(U)   The WSE, with Service and Agency support, shall continue with the R&D in the Operational Utility of ADP Program through FY 1984; after the WWMCCS Council decision on WIS architectures, emphasis should be on performance specifications for the WIS Target Architecture. An assessment should be made of continued use of the Operational Test-bed for C^3 demonstrations after FY 1984 and implementation of an advanced technology test-bed to complement WIS evolutionary development.

(U)   Services, OJCS, Agencies and WSE will continue to implement interface standards and operational procedures to ensure effective data and information exchange, and ensure that existing and programmed C^3 digital data transfer requirements can be supported by AUTODIN II.

(U)   Services and Agencies shall continue to fund near-term O&M of the dedicated WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN); including funds for lease of communications circuits and maintenance of ADP equipment. Funds should be programmed for the transfer of the dedicated WIN to AUTODIN II which will be implemented during FY 1981. Funds are needed in the following areas: purchase and/or lease of computer hardware for the WWMCCS Network Front Ends (WNFE) to interface the WWMCCS computers to AUTODIN II; communications leases for access lines to AUTODIN II switches; and preparation of sites for installation of AUTODIN II associated ADP Equipment and communications.

II.. THEATER AND TACTICAL C^3I (U)

    A. THEATER COMMAND AND CONTROL   (U)

(C)   JCS and Services, in coordination with the WSE, shall complete systems definition efforts for the full range of capabilities the Joint Crisis Management Capability (JCMC) program is intended to provide. Army supported by the Air Force shall establish a JCMC program management structure with strong WSE involvement. Army shall program to procure JCMC to completion of first set in FY 1981, and Air Force shall program aircraft modification for JCMC.

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(C)   Air Force shall program for maintenance of the present ground-alert posture of the CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and CINCEUR airborne command posts.

B. THEATER SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (U)

(S)   Navy shall continue advanced technology efforts on the interaction of acoustic and non-acoustic sensors and data correlation techniques for both surface and undersea surveillance.

C. THEATER INFORMATION SYSTEMS (U)

(C)   . Services, NSA and DCA shall program resources to support the Computer Security consortium and research in general-purpose multilevel secure ADP systems. NSA shall program resources to establish a capability, in accordance with direction to be furnished by OSD, to evaluate commercial and military developed ADP systems for potential use in DoD multilevel secure applications. Services and Agencies should establish a capability to implement and maintain qualified secure ADP systems for use in system developments within their cognizance.

(U)   Navy shall program to exploit the Pacific MME and pursue Automated Test Message Handling.

D. TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL (U)

(S)   Services shall implement plans and training to ensure against catastrophic failure of tactical C^2 systems, e.g., all automated systems should have a fallback manual operation mode.

(S)   Services shall program for continued support to the joint BETA project. BETA results and end products are to be fed as appropriate into the Army's All Source Analysis System (ASAS), TOS and TACFIRE; the Air Force's Tactical Fusion Division, Intelligence Integration System (IIS) and 485L; the Navy's TFCC/IC's; and the Marine Corps' IAC. The BETA test bed should be designed and developed to ensure that NATO objectives are met. Test plans should ensure that all interfaces with Service/NATO systems are examined and tested where appropriate.

(U)   Services shall continue to work closely with the JINTACCS program to ensure that joint interoperability of tactical C^2 systems is achieved at the earliest possible time. The program shall emphasize hardware testing for compatibility demonstration.

(S)   Army should continue its efforts to achieve early fielding of the Tactical Operations System (TOS). Software development should ensure sufficient flexibility to allow TOS to be an evolutionary system which is adaptive to chaining commanders and combat situations. TOS should also be closely coupled with the BETA program to derive maximum benefit from the products of that effort.

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(U)   Services shall program for continued RDT&E (on a shared basis) and procurement of the Class II JTIDS terminal, in accordance with the ASD(C^3I) memorandum of 15 March 1979; and for RDT&E efforts necessary to develop a Class III terminal based on ATDMA technology. Army, Navy, and Air Force Frequency Managers will complete necessary actions to achieve JTIDS frequency clearance in NATO countries and other areas.

(U)   Army, Navy, and Air Force, in coordination with JCS, shall program for development of a detailed NATO-integrated employment and operational concept plan for use of JTIDS voice and data, in concert with U.S. and NATO efforts to secure JTIDS frequency clearance in NATO countries where JTIDS will be operated in peacetime. Army, Navy, and Air Force, in coordination with JCS, shall program for development of a NATO-integrated operational concept for each weapon system to be equipped with JTIDS and planned for deployment to NATO during 1982-1990.

(S)   Army shall: continue its efforts to field an interim quick reaction capability Control and Analysis Center (CAC); accelerate the development of its military family of computers to meet production schedules for new systems such as TOS, and to expedite early availability of ASAS; and follow through with plans to develop a Division Air Defense Command and Control test-bed at sufficiently high priority to allow for early fielding of an operational system.

(C)   Air Force shall continue its effort to automate the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). Plans for incorporation of the FRG-developed Eifel/Distel System at the Sembach ATOC should continue.

(S)   Air Force should continue efforts underway to ensure that the AWACS Enhancement Program and NATO AEW program plans are carefully coordinated to achieve interoperability and cost/schedule efficiency. Particular emphasis should be placed on the resolution of the APY-1/ Rapier EMC problem.

(S)   Air Force shall review Navy E-2C accomplishments and programs for automatic track initiation and tracking for applicability to the E-3A and furnish a report to OASD(C^3I) (Combat Support), delineating technical feasibility and programmatic issues for using Navy technology to achieve a major upgrade in E-3A track capacity, prior to the FY 1982-1986 POM.

(S)   Marine Corps shall investigate the possibility of adopting the NATO Allied Command Europe-Air Command and Control System (ACE-ACCS) concept for application in the Tactical Combat Operations System.

(S)   Navy shall prepare quantitative performance requirements and resolve intelligence, command and control, and communications interfaces for the Tactical Flag Commander Center (TFCC) prior to entry into system validation. Emphasis in the TFCC should be on evolutionary development consistent with integration of existing shipboard C^3I facilities.

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E. TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND TARGET ACQUISITION (SR&TA) (U)

1. Army (U)

(S)   Army shall plan to achieve "fail-soft" interrelationships to enhance functional survivability in combat for such systems as QUICK FIX/TRAILBLAZER, QUICK LOOK/TEAMPACK, and GUARDRAIL/TACELIS; fusion of SOTAS and OV-1D imagery with SIGINT products; and real-time utilization of SOTAS to cue, for example, SHORADS. Appropriate data-exchange mechanisms with Air Force and Marine Corps counterpart systems are required.

(S)   Army shall program for continuation of the GUARDRAIL V (COMINT) product improvement program, emphasizing interoperability with the Air Force TR-1/COMPASS QUASAR to achieve a near-term communications time-of-arrival (TOA) emitter-location capability, and retain the RU-21J aircraft in a developmental test-bed configuration for use in prototyping GUARDRAIL improvements.

(U)   Army shall program for continued implementation of a tactical DDP to provide timely dissemination of imagery in the theater.

2. Air Force (U)

(S)   Affordability of the TR-1 platform necessitates its utilization in a multifunction role to include PLSS, AMTI surveillance, ASSAULT BREAKER target acquisition and weapons guidance, and ELINT pay-load alternatives. Air Force shall develop a comprehensive plan for such utilization, and program to support implementation.

(C)   Modular standardization of airborne reconnaissance and surveillance radar programs is needed in two generic functional cate-gories: 1) continuous area surveillance of moving ground targets at extended range and normal resolution, and 2) periodic swath or spot mapping of fixed targets at high resolution and nominal ranges. Air Force shall plan and program efforts in this area accordingly.

(C)   Air Force should evaluate jointly with Army and NSA the feasibility of using Army direct intelligence support assets for the Mobile Mission Equipment Upgrade program to avoid unnecessary duplication of ground based equipment.

3. Marine Corps (U)

(U)   Marine Corps shall continue to coordinate acquisition of tactical intelligence support systems with Army and Air Force.

(C)   Marine Corps shall program for acquisition of a man-transportable VHF/UHF intercept and direction-finding capability which can be consolidated with the Integrated Communications Collection System (ICCS). Army shall assist in this effort.

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(C)   Marine Corps shall program for a real-time airborne multisensor correlation capability utilizing Air Force UPD-4/TEREC experience.

        4. Navy (U)

(C)   Navy shall program for acquisition of a fleet reconnaissance/surveillance capability, in accordance with the findings of the CHESS study, Navy photo reconnaissance study, and the Navy Master Plan for Ocean Surveillance, and reflecting close coordination with Army/Air Force interoperability efforts and utilization of previous equipment investments.

        F. TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS (U)

(U)   Services and DCA shall complete or update their transition planning, including COMSEC, to identify quantitative requirements for TRI-TAC and other tactical communications equipment. Further procurement of equipment, including COMSEC, which accomplishes the same function as, or is to be replaced by, TRI-TAC equipment shall not be initiated except by approval of OSD. Services should develop necessary installation kits and plans for field deployment of new TRI-TAC COMSEC subscriber terminal devices (e.g., KG-84). Programming of resources for testing of TRI-TAC equipment shall include those required for the Joint Test Element.

(U)   Services shall program for implementation of programs to provide Joint Multi-Trunk Switching System (JMTSS) capabilities as requirements are validated by the JCS and confirmed by DUSD(Policy Review).

(U)   The GPSCS program is redefined as a technology-only effort to support development of technology for future jam-resistant satellite communications to tactical and mobile forces of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Responsibility for the development of acquisition of space-segment hardware for GPSCS and other future satellite communications programs continues to be assigned to the Air Force. Services shall provide their requirements and specifications to the MSO for consideration and transmittal to the Air Force for development and eventual acquisition as appropriate.

(S)   Army, in coordination with the MSO and Air Force, shall investigate options and program development efforts to improve communications to nuclear weapons storage (NWS) sites in a combat environment, to include jamming, nuclear effects, and hostile emitter location activities. Consideration shall be given to upgrading, in an evolutionary manner, the UHF satellite communication terminals planned for delivery to NWS sites with an SHF receive capability utilizing the SCT/SHF EAM downlink on DSCS III satellites. These efforts are not to delay essential procurement upgrades called for in paragraph IV.B.1 of Section O of the Consolidated Guidance.

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(C)   Navy shall accelerate its efforts on the SHF terminal (AN/WSC-6) for shipborne operation. This effort shall be accomplished in conjunction with the fielding of the OM-55 modem in order to provide jam-resistant secure communications to major combatants and flag ships. Navy shall program for continuation of efforts to develop effective tactical communication systems for coordination of air, surface, and submarine operations.

        G. ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND COUNTER-C^3 (U)

(C)   Services shall program for accomplishment of objectives set forth in the NATO LTDP Task Force 7 Report. Counter-C^3 programs, both lethal (destruction) and non-lethal (jamming, deception and exploitation) shall be made an integral part of each Service's RDT&E and procurement programs, with the objective of fielding effective capabilities in the early 1980s.

(S)   There is a critical shortage of ECM pods for tactical aircraft, and Services shall program for high-priority procurement of such pods. Where required, internal ECM capabilities are to be acquired as a matter of high-priority.

(U)   Air Force shall take the lead for DoD, and program to implement and support the Airborne Electronic Warfare Tactics Facility in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement to be signed by the USDRE and the Armament Directors of France and Germany at the April 1979 CNAD.

(C)   Air Force shall plan funding for the EF-111A for FY 1981 and beyond to permit accomplishment of the production program as near as possible to the $858 million total used at DSARC-III.

(S)   Air Force shall program to restructure and move ahead with the Precision Location and Strike System (PLSS) Program to provide for integration of DME guidance with the GBU-15 Planar Wing Weapon.

III. <u>INTELLIGENCE</u> (U)

        A. CONSOLIDATED CRYPTOLOGIC PROGRAM (U)

(U)   Additional guidance is given in the Intelligence Annex to Section 0 of the Consolidated Guidance, to be issued at a higher classification.

        B. GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS (U)

(U)   Additional guidance is given in the Intelligence Annex to Section 0 of the Consolidated Guidance, to be issued at a higher classification.

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C. INDICATIONS AND WARNING (U)

(S)   DIA shall: program to expedite completion of the Warning Improvement Study and Plan and the Central Region test case, according WISP a more rigorous role in the overall planning for the DoD I&W System upgrade, particularly as it encourages and enjoys the support from the intelligence community and as it focuses upon both hard and soft indicators of crises; develop a functional implementation plan for the phased upgrade of the I&W system; and develop performance evaluation techniques for the measurement of collector performance against I&W requirements, initially for imaging systems and subsequently for other collection disciplines.

D. OTHER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS (U)

(U)   The following supplements material in the Consolidated Guidance pertaining to Intelligence-Related Training.

(U)   Improve on performance/position evaluation programs with specific emphasis on required modifications to intelligence curricula. This includes the foreign language capabilities in, and in support of, intelligence and SIGINT missions.

(U)   Executive agent training shall be continued and expanded in accordance with appropriate DoD Directives/Instructions. Each Service shall report, in their respective POMs, the level and extent of training provided to other components.

(U)   Services shall submit, not later than 30 May 1979, a listing of all new systems with IOC's in FY 1981-1985 that will require new or modified curricula at the military intelligence schools. Major program elements should be identified and training development costs should be included.

(U)   The enlisted fill rate at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center shall not deviate by more than 15 percent from annual Service projection to the DLIFLC.

(U)   Each Service shall identify in its POM submission all Reserve and Guard units with M-day assignments in intelligence. For these units, current state of manning, readiness, and a brief summary of training activities shall be presented.

IV. DEFENSE-C^{3}I SUPPORT (U)

A. NAVIGATION AND POSITION-FIXING (U)

(C)   Air Force shall program to ensure a system IOC for NAVSTAR GPS by FY 1986, including appropriate funding for space launch support; and identify increments to this program to achieve a system IOC in FY 1985.

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(C)   Services shall program to support full-scale competitive development of GPS user equipment; plan on a system IOC by 1986 and identify increments to their programs to support IOC in FY 1985. Service POMs should report user equipment acquisition schedules and numbers of user equipments'that will be operational, by fiscal year. Funding for procurement and installation should be programmed in consonance with the JCS phase-in/phase-out plan.

(U)   Navy should consider the need for development of NTS-3 and should provide supporting rationale for continuing or canceling this effort.

(U)'   Where operational considerations permit, Services shall continue to use commercial inertial navigation systems meeting the ARINC-561 specifications for all land-based military aircraft.

(U)   Air Force shall continue to pursue Form, Fit, and Function (F^3) standardization of inertial systems for high-performance, land-based military aircraft and possible extension to NATO. Both development and procurement should be competitive with multiple-source awards where practical for full evaluation of this approach.

(U)   Services, with Navy leading the effort, shall program for continued development of ring-laser gyro sensors and systems for broad applications to aircraft and weapons. Commonality among the Services remains a primary long-range goal.

   B.   SUPPORT AND BASE COMMUNICATIONS   (U)

(U)   Services should program for early consolidation and automation of GENSER and Intelligence telecommunications centers on an intra- and inter-Service basis wherever possible. Services and Agencies should continue to consider use of contractor installation, operation and maintenance of base communication system and facilities, giving consideration to combat mission support, location, training and mobilization requirements for skills which need to be maintained.

(U)   Army shall program for early implementation of the European Telephone System.

(U)   Services shall program and implement Defense Metropolitan Area Telephone Systems in accordance with guidance provided in the ASD(C^3I) memorandum of 12 February 1979.

   C.   COMMON-USER COMMUNICATIONS   (U)

      1.   General Guidance   (U)

(C)   Services and Agencies shall program to ensure interconnection and interoperability of U.S., NATO, European National Military and European National Civil Communications Systems to achieve best possible communications survivability in Europe. Theater communications systems developments shall conform with NATO standards for interoperability with national C^3 systems as they emerge.

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(U)   Where available to meet U.S. needs in NATO Europe, Services and Agencies shall lease commercial communications facilities rather than installing U.S. procured equipment. U.S. unilateral communications will be used only to provide minimum essential control of U.S. forces and to complement NATO and NATO member nation telecommunications when NATO or host telecommunications are nonexistent, inadequate, or not cost-effective for U.S. use.

(C)   Services shall develop plans to protect critical U.S.-owned satellite earth stations from attack by paramilitary and/or terrorist threats in both peacetime and wartime.

(U)   The MSO, supported by the Services and Agencies, shall develop and submit to OSD a Technical Program Plan for a coherent DoD satellite communications system R&D program in accordance with the MSO's "Framework for MILSATCOM Development." The first issue of the Plan should frame a sound technical foundation for the next generation of satellite communication systems with distinctly enhanced military-unique attributes, and address the need for a developmental satellite payload and complementary terminals. Until the Plan is approved, Army and Air Force shall support R&D projects identified in the FY 1981-85 DSCS Program Plan.

(U)   Redundant single Service systems must be consolidated into joint Service systems. New systems must be compatible with already existing C^3I systems, procedures, and standards. Automation must be selectively exploited to improve effectiveness and efficiency and to reduce manning. Examine the use of commercially available technology and equipment in the acquisition of small quantities of special C^3I systems. A comprehensive plan must be implemented for consolidation of redundant individual-Service dedicated communication centers.

2. Specific Guidance (U)

     a. Long-Haul Communications (U)

(C)   Defense Communication System (DCS) and intelligence-related architectural concepts and implementation efforts should be restructured to provide reduced vulnerability and improved flexibility, reconstitution and survivability in crisis and wartime operations. Increased use of host-nation and NATO assets should be planned for DCA connectivity.

(C)   DCA, in coordination and participation with NSA, the Services, NICSMA, TRI-TAC and as appropriate the Manager, National Communications System (NCS), should: complete development of a World-wide Digital System Architecture which incorporates the architectures (or required changes to them) for the Worldwide Secure Voice (WWSV), Integrated AUTODIN System (IAS), TRI-TAC, NICS II, and major Service programs and networks; continue efforts towards digitization and modernization of DCS; develop analog and digital interfaces to provide

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for improved interoperability between military systems, non-DoD
Federal Government systems and leased commercial systems; carry out
approved plans for DCS bulk encryption; plan to interconnect AUTOVON
and IVSN to enhance DCS/NATO interoperability; continue efforts to
fully define an evolutionary IAS; develop and implement the hardware,
software and means for integrating existing and programmed DoD data
networks; plan, fund and implement a Secure Voice Improvement Program
(SVIP) (successor program to AUTOSEVOCOM II) with initial secure
voice terminal procurements in FY 1981 and completion of procurement
in FY 1985; and continue implementation of the Digital European
Backbone with completion of procurement in FY 1984. Leasing of
communications and support services shall be employed wherever
cost-effective, operationally feasible, and security requirements
permit. Any changes to AUTODIN I, AUTOVON, AUTOSEVOCOM I or exten-
sion of AUTODIN II service to overseas areas shall be made only
with the approval of OSD.

(C)   Commercial off-the-shelf, or modified, equipment will
be used for the DCS where practical. DCS use of mobile/transportable
equipment should normally be limited to applications where there is a
need for rapid reconstitution or extension of the DCS, use of both
commercial and tactical equipments to support tactical and/or NATO
interoperability requirement, or where the need for mobility/rapid
recoverability is overriding.

(C)   Services and Agencies shall plan for integration of
data networks into AUTODIN II at the earliest practical date and
early extension of service to Europe and the Pacific. It is intended
that Services and Agencies reduce dependence on dedicated data net-
works after implementation of AUTODIN II. Data transfer systems and
networks not utilizing AUTODIN II must be approved as exceptions to
this guidance by OSD.

(C)   Services, JCS, and Defense Agencies and WSE will
continue to implement interface standards and operational procedures
to ensure effective data and information exchange. They will ensure
that existing and programmed C^3 digital data transfer requirements can
be supported by the planned AUTODIN II system when implemented.

b. Satellite Communications (U)

(C)   In accordance with FY 1980 budget decisions, procure-
ment of DSCS III satellites is delayed to 1981 and two additional DSCS
II satellites shall be procured with FY 1980 funds to preclude a gap in
service until DSCS III satellites are available. In consonance with the
MSO Framework for MILSATCOM Development published in November 1978,
initial efforts to define a long term DSCS program should be initiated.
Accordingly, DCA and NSA should begin efforts to define an EHF system
for intelligence users. Similarly, DCA and Army should begin efforts
to define an EHF system for the Ground Mobile Forces.

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(C)   To continue use of each other's SHF SATCOM systems, it is imperative that the next generation of U.S. and NATO SATCOM systems be interoperable. The DCA, MSO, and the DoD lead agency will work with NATO to achieve commonality of U.S. and NATO space segments, with a goal of completely interoperable ground terminals.

D. COMSEC (U)

(S)   Services and NSA shall continue their programs directed toward providing secure, interoperable communications for tactical data systems. Services, OJCS, and Agencies shall specify requirements for weapon-system test ranges, and weapon and space system telemetry encryption. NSA shall continue to develop devices for securing telemetry subsystems. In addition, Services shall design all nuclear command and control systems to meet the numerical standards of DoDD 5200.16. Services and Agencies which have not done so shall implement DoDD 5200.16.

(C)   Navy and NSA, with Director, TRI-TAC as DoD Executive Agent, shall continue development of a family of 2.4 Kbps digital voice terminals which are consistent with the Worldwide Secure Voice Architecture.

(S)   In view of the continuing compromising emanations threat, Services and Defense Agencies shall maintain personnel and other TEMPEST resources at or above FY 1980 levels. In order to support operational deployment of the new TRI-TAC COMSEC terminal with the TYC-39 switch, Services shall program teletype conversion from high-level to low-level keying in accordance with MIL STD 188. Other teletype terminals now passing classified traffic should be similarly modified in accordance with national policy which required such conversion by 1 January 1976.

(C)   Services, in collaboration with NSA, shall continue efforts to improve signals security monitoring and surveillance capabilities in order to evaluate vulnerability to signals exploitation.

(C)   NSA shall program to establish and maintain a national COMSEC assessment program, and in collaboration with the Services shall establish and maintain a central data base on hostile COMINT threats to U.S. government telecommunications and electrical processing systems.

(C)   In accordance with OSD guidance, NSA shall program resources in support of the need to meet national policy on securing civil government voice systems.

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SECRET

(C)   Services should program an adequate level of COMSEC RDT&E to ensure effective integration of new COMSEC systems into Service operations. Services should program resources for the near-term expansion of AUTOSEVOCOM I, DCS Secure Voice Improvement Program (SVIP) and AUTODIN II in accordance with implementation schedules. DoD components should begin to replace the existing inventory of general purpose record security equipment where economies can be clearly demonstrated or where maintenance support is no longer feasible. Transition plans should be developed to ensure orderly implementation.

(S)   All Services shall commence planning for the incorporation of interoperable jam-resistant secure data and voice communications into tactical aircraft, with the earliest IOC and FOC by 1985.

      E. TEST AND EVALUATION (U)

(U)   Services and Agencies shall continue to strengthen operational test and evaluation of C^3I systems, POMs shall delineate efforts to accomplish the following specific goals: improved design and conduct of tests, independent evaluation of test results, and reduction of test costs.

(U)   Services and Agencies shall program adequate resources and appropriate schedules for both DT&E and OT&E which support acquisition milestones, to ensure use of critical issues and thresholds derived from operational requirements in designing and managing C^3 system test programs.

(U)   NFIP activities are exempted from this guidance.

SECRET